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The purpose of this joint applied project is to examine the trends in funding of the 
Department of Defense (DOD), assess the importance of robust research and 
development investment on national security and warfighters’ capabilities, and justify 
continued devotion to funding DOD research and development (R&D).  
This research looks at the history of DOD R&D budgets and examines R&D 
spending trends and the importance of R&D to warfighters and humanity. An evaluation 
of the DOD’s R&D infrastructure and the impacts that drive future funding decisions are 
also part of this research. 
The case study of GPS is the primary example to defend the importance of R&D. 
The case study ranges from the history of its discovery, how it applies to the military, the 
associated compounded benefits to other discoveries and technological improvements 
due to the maturation of GPS, to the associated benefits to the U.S. economy. 
Maintaining the proper level of DOD R&D funding in each fiscal year is 
imperative to allowing DOD agencies to pursue R&D projects that enhance the 
warfighter’s future competencies and well-being in combat and in disaster-relief 
circumstances. Appropriate R&D funding also provides for accelerating mature 
technology solutions to be deployed with the current fighting force. 
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As a critical element of innovation, research and development (R&D) has been 
one of the key elements of progress, allowing companies to create new products and 
enhance existing ones. R&D is also an important mechanism used by companies to 
increase their market share and create new competitive advantages. R&D plays a critical 
role in enhancing/supporting the United States’ national security as well as long-term 
scientific and technological future applications/capabilities for our warfighters. Examples 
include: robotics, cybersecurity, advanced sensors, the internet-of-Things, advance 
material science and predictive analytics. 
The National Science Foundation (NSF) (2010) defines “research” as: “A 
systematic study directed toward fuller scientific knowledge or understanding of the 
subject studied.” NSF also defines “development” as: “A systematic application of 
knowledge or understanding directed toward the production of useful materials, devices, 
and systems or methods, including design, development, and improvement of prototypes 
and new processes to meet specific requirements.”  
The DOD fosters a climate conducive to establishing and developing R&D 
cooperation between DOD agencies and private sectors. Such cooperation is critical in 
connecting people, resources and strategies. Together, they have developed, improved, 
and promoted new technologies, future weapons systems, and sustained technological 
superiority that our military has benefited from for several decades. 
The DOD is also endorsing multilateral international research and development 
agreements and information exchanges with partner nations and allies to expand the R&D 
information base and to assess diverse solutions for similar technical challenges.  
As the Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel stated in 2014 Quadrennial Defense 
Review (QDR): 
Investment decisions will ensure that we maintain our technological edge 
over potential adversaries, and that we advance U.S. interests across all 
domains. Staying ahead of security challenges requires that we continue to 
innovate, not only in the technologies we develop, but in the way U.S. 
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forces operate. Innovation—within the Department and working with 
other U.S. departments and agencies and with international partners—will 
be center stage as we adapt to meet future challenges. (Hagel, 2014) 
A. OVERVIEW OF DOD BUDGETS 
The responsibility of Congress with regard to federal budget practice was changed 
in 1974 with the release (enactment) of the Congressional Budget Control Act, which is 
the blueprint for all four budgetary phases. They are: formulation, enactment, execution, 
audit and evaluation. Congress also established the Congressional Budget Office and was 
granted the authority to direct federal spending. Standing budget committees were created 
in the Senate and House of Representatives (Amadeo, 2016b).   
The Senate and House of Representatives could use their budgets to negotiate 
during the time the appropriation bills are finalized. Budget development starts in the 
early fall, one year prior to the new fiscal year, which begins October 1 of the preceding 
calendar year. For example, for fiscal year 2017 (which begins Oct. 1, 2016), the budget 
process started in the fall of 2015 (i.e., one year prior). During this time, the Executive 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) compiles budget requests received from 
federal agencies, and submits the final compiled budget for the subsequent fiscal year to 
the president in December. The legal deadline for release of the president’s budget 
recommendations to Congress is February of each year. These recommendations outline 
the president’s funding priorities. Part of the budget process constitutes a yearly 
concession between the president and Congress in defining a discretionary spending plan. 
The Congressional Budget Office provides a detailed review of the president’s yearly 
budget and supports Congress by providing unbiased review of the budget. After the 
Budget Resolution is approved in mid-spring, Congress develops spending appropriation 
bills that fund every agency in the discretionary budget. Before October 1 (and thus, the 
new fiscal year), these appropriation bills should be signed into law by the president 
(Christensen, 2012, pp. 3–7).   
Acquisition programs are financed through budgets authorities provided by 
Congress. Budgets, as a policy, disclose the government’s main concerns; they are 
complex and difficult to assess. An Appropriation act is a mechanism used by Congress 
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to provide the budget authority used to finance program efforts. Each appropriation act 
has a certain purpose and defines/limits the amount of budget authority allocated by 
Congress annually (per the Defense Appropriations Act) that is used to make payments to 
various agencies. The major appropriation categories received by DOD are listed below: 
• Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)  
• procurement  
• Operation and Maintenance (O&M) 
• Military Personnel (MILPERS) 
• Military Construction (MILCON) 
Given that the appropriation categories listed above are generic groupings, 
appropriation expenditure accounts are used by Congress to clearly specify particularities 
of each appropriation account. The appropriation expenditure accounts are assigned four-
digit codes, of which each DOD Department has a two-digit code for convenience/
designation purposes. Each appropriation act is signed into law by the president 
(Christensen, 2012, pp. 3–7). 
1. DOD R&D Budget 
Each fiscal year (e.g., FY16), a budget request should be released by the president 
in February of the previous year (2015). The budget includes both mandatory and 
discretionary spending. Mandatory spending includes Medicare, Social Security, 
Medicaid, etc. Discretionary spending separately contains a general defense and 
nondefense budget and a defense and nondefense R&D budget. For 2016, 29% of the 
total budget would be allocated to discretionary spending accounts (Hourihan & Parkes, 
2016). This discretionary spending is addressed through the annual appropriations 
process. 
In the DOD, there are two types of budgets: investment-type budgets and 
expense-type budgets. R&D is one of the common appropriations in our defense budget 
and is part of expense-type category. The obligation period for R&D is two years. 
Typically it covers: 
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• trade studies 
• basic and applied research  
• system design and integration  
• operational system improvements  
• systems engineering and program management 
• advanced technology development  
• system test and evaluation 
• development, fabrication, assembly and test of prototypes 
• system development and demonstration 
All the activities listed above are estimated and represented by the following 
Defense Acquisition System (DAS) phases: 
• Material Solution Analysis Phase 
• Technology Development Phase 
• Engineering & Manufacturing Development Phase  
 
2. DOD R&D Budget Categories 
Within the defense department, R&D activities are segmented as being one of two 
portfolios: DOD R&D portfolio and defense-related R&D portfolio. The DOD R&D 
portfolio is funded through the DOD R&D budget, whereas the defense-related R&D 
portfolio is funded through the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), which 
is part of the Department of Energy (DoE).  
The DOD Financial Management Regulation identifies and defines the following 
R&D activities: 
• Science and Technology (S&T) Activities  
• basic research (6.1) 
• applied research (6.2) 
• Advanced Technology Development (ATD) (6.3) 
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• Weapons Development Activities 
• Advanced Component Development and Prototypes (ACD&P) 
(6.4) 
• System Development and Demonstration (SDD) (6.5) 
• RDT&E Management Support (6.6) 
• Operational System Development (6.7) 
• R&D Equipment 
• R&D Facilities (RAND Corporation 1998) 
S&T Initiatives: countermeasures to asymmetrical threats, ballistic missile 
defense, moving-target tracking, network centric warfare, unmanned land, air, space, sea, 
and underwater systems, etc. (Etter, 2001). 
3. DOD R&D Funding History 
During World War I, the Council of National Defense (CND) was instituted to 
fund and oversee all defense research activities supporting the military. In 1940, the 
National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) was founded to manage, direct, and 
carry out scientific research, development and production on warfare systems. This 
organization did not have the funding required to bring the outcome of the research into 
the next phase of production. In response, President Roosevelt, through an executive 
order, created the Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD) that provided 
the funding and contracting infrastructure for the research, development, and 
experimental investigations activities performed by NDRC. The OSRD had spent $450 
million by the end of the World War II on developing new and more reliable weapon 
systems. In the postwar era, OSRD played an important role in engaging industry and 
universities in defense R&D activities. During the Cold War period, defense R&D 
spending soared, peaking in 1960 when it accounted for 80% of federal R&D funds, with 
emphasis on cutting edge weapon systems development. This approach elevated the U.S. 
as a leader in defense technological development above Europe and everywhere else in 
the world. Between 1960 and 1980, the defense R&D funding constituted approximately 
50% of the federal R&D budget. (Steinbock, 2014). During the Reagan presidency, the 
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military’s investment in advanced-technology development and acquisition investment 
increased such that defense R&D was above 0.80% of GDP. Inversely proportionate with 
those of the U.S., defense budgets around the world fell after the collapse of Soviet 
Union. For the U.S., defense R&D spending surged again after the events of September 
2001, reaching over $50B in 2003 and exceeding $83B in 2009. By 2015, the defense 
R&D budget approached $68B (Weiss & Vahey, 2014).  
4. Summary 
R&D obligations are only a fraction of the overall DOD expenditure in 
developing cutting edge technology for the warfighters. Yet, the trend for funding R&D 
is in an overall decline. More recently, in FY2014, the DOD obligated around $28B on 
R&D, less than was invested 15 years ago, in FY1998 (roughly $31B after adjusting for 
inflation).   
The graph in Figure 1 shows that for the past 20 years, the defense R&D 
obligations dropped from 19%, in FY 1998 to 10% in FY 2014. 
 
Figure 1.  DOD Obligations by Major Categories. Source: Schwartz, Ginsberg, 
& Sargent (2015). 
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B. THESIS STATEMENT / SCOPE OF RESEARCH AREAS 
1. Thesis Statement 
An analysis of The Global Positioning System (GPS) R&D Program as a case 
study illustrating DOD R&D and its associated successes to justify the continued 
investments into and sustainment of DOD R&D budgets.  
2. Secondary Questions 
The secondary questions associated with defending the thesis statement are as 
follows: 
• What R&D organizations were in place to successfully develop the GPS 
system we know today? 
• What budgets and schedules influenced the GPS development? 
• What are the implications of GPS successes resultant from R&D 
investments? 
Research and development is critical in establishing where military Services can 
improve warfighters’ capabilities. The level of current defense R&D funding is especially 
important to the challenge of responding to global security risks and maintaining military 
strength. Given the DOD budget pressure (downward) and the defense R&D funding 
trend for the past several years, DOD faces challenges sustaining adequate R&D 
capabilities for the U.S. to preserve a leading military advantage and help develop 
sustainable, cutting-edge technology needed by the warfighter.   
Is the current level of defense R&D budget adequate to maintain and upgrade the 
existing military systems and support the development of future defense needs? In 2014, 
Mr. Frank Kendall – the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 
Logistics – expressed his concerns to emphasize the importance of maintaining a robust 
DOD R&D investment for warfighters’ capabilities; he stated the following in his article 
“Protecting the Future:”  
Most of all, however, I am concerned about protecting the adequacy of our 
research and development (R&D) investments in capabilities and systems 
that will allow us to dominate on future battlefields and keep engineering 
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design teams who develop advanced defense systems. (Kendall, 2014, p. 
2)  
In the same article, Mr. Kendall emphasized the issue and urgencies surrounding 
defense R&D being inadequately funded, and stressed the following points: 
• “U.S. technological superiority is not guaranteed – and is under constant 
attack by state actors such as Russia and China. 
• As such, research and development is actually a fixed cost, NOT a 
variable cost.  The implication is that reducing R&D proportionally to 
procurement is a risk with huge negative implications for the nation.  
• Time is a precious, unrecoverable asset.  We cannot get back lost R&D 
time” (Kendall, 2014, p. 3). 
With DOD budgets facing continuous scrutiny and receiving high levels of 
visibility, the quest to curtail spending within the government and DOD is effervescent. 
When programs short on funding have been deemed a high priority, the funding is cut 
from other programs deemed less important. Often times, R&D is the recipient of the 
cuts.   
This research effort will focus on the following areas: 
• historical overview of DOD R&D 
• DOD R&D infrastructure 
• articulation of the importance of DOD R&D through many experienced 
successes, specifically the Global Positioning System (GPS).   
• DOD R&D budget analysis 
• GPS case study analysis 
These research areas will support the thesis on the defense of why past 
investments in DOD R&D have been worthwhile, and why investments in the future 
should continue. 
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II. HISTORY OF DOD R&D 
“Science is the shield of the free world.” 
—Louis Ridenour 
 
Creating and sustaining a healthy R&D competence will necessitate an alignment 
of many things, including an improved R&D strategy, a well-defined mission for national 
security, laboratories and equipment, predictable funding, and an experienced scientific 
and engineering workforce to carry out the strategy. Some of the disruptive, revolutionary 
research and development programs sponsored by DOD had a powerful impact on 
nation’s defense capabilities, fundamentally changed military strategies and also shaped 
the defense R&D (Ehrhard, 2008). 
A. R&D’S ROLE IN NATIONAL SECURITY 
The concept of Research and Development (R&D), as most applicable to the 
current day definition within DOD, started just before World War II.   Following FY38, 
and the years leading up to the U.S.’ foray into WWII, there was a significant shift in 
focus and resources toward the employment of scientists and physicists. Before this 
change in mindset, the traditional focus was on engineers. The U.S. sought to implement 
a vision to strengthen both offensive and defensive postures (national security) that 
consisted of unifying the capabilities and output of both engineers and scientists. The 
Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), formally established in 1941, 
was the main beneficiary/recipient of these resources. The director of OSRD reported 
directly to President Roosevelt, who allowed essentially unlimited resources to execute 
their mission. The Manhattan Project, still considered the most extensive research 
program in U.S. history, fell under OSRD management. The notion of National Security 
was bolstered due to the proactive vision and execution of R&D regarding the creation of 
the atomic bomb, deemed a Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) (Spiers, 2000). 
R&D played a significant role in solidifying National Security. The vision for 
enhanced R&D, and the notion of empowering scientists to conduct militaristic research 
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originated from outside the U.S. In late 1939, President Roosevelt was approached by a 
group of scientists to commence a research program to focus on a groundbreaking 
discovery that would assist in the creation of the atomic bomb (“Encyclopedia of the New 
American Nation” n.d.). Scientists from foreign countries were active participants and 
employed under the Manhattan Project. Many of these scientists were Jewish defectors 
fleeing the holocaust and active WWII conflict in Europe. As the conflict escalated, the 
U.S. began to shroud its research and development efforts in secrecy to ensure the rest of 
the world did not  realize its interests, vision, and final products that were to result from 
extensive research. These results led to improved National Security and set the stage for 
the creation of other security agencies. These agencies were chartered with the protection 
of sensitive datasets and the assurance that foreign countries did not  know or have access 
to U.S. military intellectual property (Lee, n.d.). 
As the U.S. began to safeguard its R&D, its reputation for facilitating research 
began to spread. This encouraged foreign scientists with ideas, yet without resources, to 
pursue relationships with the U.S.: “In 1940, the eminent British scientific leader Sir 
Henry Tizard flew to Washington on a secret mission to persuade the U.S. government to 
cooperate in building a system of radar and radar countermeasures” (“Encyclopedia of 
the New American Nation,” n.d.). Under OSRD, British scientists were able to leverage 
the vast resources of the U.S. and produce penicillin in mass quantities. 
As U.S. investments in R&D grew in the early 1940s, along with tangible output 
and success, its paranoia about foreign access to U.S. intellectual property and “secrets” 
continued to grow. Not only did the U.S. act on the importance of safeguarding both their 
intelligence and intellectual property, but it also decided to stand up organizations that 
focus on the active pursuit of knowledge of foreign programs regarding Science and 
Technology (S&T) and military intelligence. To further articulate the lengths the U.S. 
took to safeguard R&D efforts, Harry Truman, vice president to President Roosevelt, did 
not even know the Manhattan Project existed until Truman assumed the presidency after 
Roosevelt’s death in 1945. These notions laid the groundwork to form specific 
organizations, such as the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency. 
The long term impacts to the investment and sustainment of DOD R&D has led to many 
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discoveries, creations, and implementations that exceed the boundaries of military 
applications and National Security. Such boundaries even exceeded the betterment of the 
U.S., as many countries have benefitted from U.S. R&D (Kester, Research America).  
B. R&D INFRASTRUCTURE  
Throughout World War I, important military innovations were developed such as 
gas warfare, aviation, military electronics, artillery field spotting, interception and 
jamming of radio transmissions, etc. Still, due to organizational limitations, the scientific 
inputs to the military during that period were minimal. Prior to World War II, U.S. 
Defense spending was low due to a favorable security situation (and thus, less needed). In 
peacetime until World War II, the United States government supported development of 
technology and innovation using policies associated with specific national purposes. 
R&D was primarily used by large corporations during that period.  
R&D efforts during World War II influenced technological innovations strategies; 
and as a result, great scientific discoveries were made such as: the development of the 
radar system, the Manhattan Project, the aircraft carrier, the jet engine, nerve gases and 
the development of systematic methods of weapons performance analysis and 
requirements. R&D efforts also paved the road and influenced defense R&D management 
methods used for projects developed during the postwar. These projects, along with other 
wartime technological developments, generated the guidance and framework that are 
used today by defense programs and showed how warfighters, researchers, and industry 
worked together and were able to reach world-class technological advancement 
(Finnamore, 2015). 
One other aspect that contributed to successful development of these weapon 
systems was the partnership between the government and the scientific research 
community. Experience gained from the war, along with government support, led to 
continuation of R&D in postwar time. Postwar innovations were strongly affected by 
defense procurement and R&D due to a great demand for weapons systems. Defense 
funding and supporting legislation had a critical role in maintaining the research activities 
performed by academia and defense contractors supporting such demand. Technology 
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development’s criticality to national security was understood after the development of the 
atomic bomb during World War II. It was also understood that the superiority of a 
country relies on its technological capabilities. Such understanding triggered the defense 
spending, which was $500M in 1945, to increase to $6.5B in 1966 (Leitenberg, n.d.). 
1. Establishment Of DOD R&D Centers 
a.  Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDCs) 
Overview 
For more than seventy-five years, Federally Funded Research and Development 
Centers (FFRDCs) supported defense-related objectives. Established in the 1940s under 
Federal Acquisition Regulation 35.017, FFRDCs brought engineering and scientific 
expertise that was required to address demanding defense challenges. Leading edge 
research necessitates modern facilities, state-of-the-art equipment and sustained technical 
talent. R&D institutions under FFRDC were privately owned and operated and provided 
the scientific expertise in support of the military community, a competence/skill that was 
not available within the government. There are three types of FFRDC centers performing 
different extramural activities: study and analysis centers, laboratories, and systems 
engineering. 
One such organization, instituted in 1942, was the Applied Physics Laboratory 
(APL) at Johns Hopkins University. APL’s mission was to guide contractors and 
universities in designing and developing weapon systems. Other labs were also 
established during the same period: Harvard Underwater Sound Laboratory, Jet 
Propulsion Laboratory–California Institute of Technology, and the Radiation Laboratory 
– Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Hruby et al., 2011). 
The FFRDC laboratories came under Congressional scrutiny in the mid-1970s. 
Besides the fact that many believed these laboratories were overfunded, there were also 
complaints from the Agencies that the research performed was too scientific, did not 
align with the DOD requirements, and could not be used by the military. 
In late 1969, Senator Michael Joseph introduced Section 203, known as the 
Mansfield Amendment, to the Military Authorization Act. This Amendment restricted the 
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DOD from spending appropriated funds for any study or R&D tasks that did not support 
warfighter CONOPS (Harwit, 2013). Due to lack of defense R&D funding—as a result of 
this Amendment—almost 45% of research performed for the military was dropped by 
1977. Since the FFRDC laboratories could not be adequately funded, most of these 
centers could not survive; others realigned their business processes toward not-for-profit 
or private sectors. The second round of examinations with regard to FFRDC activities 
came in 1990 when the DOD was instructed that FFRDCs must be used for government 
R&D only in situations when the government did not have the infrastructure and required 
skills to execute the projects and perform the studies related to defense needs. As of 
2011, there were only twenty-six R&D facilities (Lincoln Laboratory, Software 
Engineering Institute, etc.), nine System Analysis facilities (e.g., Institute for Defense 
Analyses, RAND Corporation) and five System Engineering centers (e.g., MITRE C3I, 
Aerospace Corp.) under FFRDC with annual funding received from different DOD 
sponsoring agencies (Navy, Air Force, Army, OSD, etc.) of up to $2.2B (Hruby & 
Manley, 2011, p. 27). 
The support provided to DOD agencies by these centers was invaluable, 
especially in responding to advanced technological defense system needs and new 
national security developments. Without the proper funding to support the FFRDC 
centers, and with a lack of highly needed R&D technological expertise of DOD agencies 
to respond to the nation’s development needs, the U.S. would have difficulty maintaining 
its defense technological leadership. For the last several years, there have been ongoing 
dialogues dedicated to defining the boundaries between the FFRDC centers involvement 
in defense R&D support and government workforce roles in these activities—still 
without a clear outcome. FFRDC institutions are uniquely positioned to address 
challenging unforeseen defense problems such as Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). 
These institutions were able to bring together specific technical skills and created the 
Joint Improvised Explosive Device Organization (JIEDDO), and through collaborative 
work, developed a solution mitigating the threat. This was a vital solution to our 
warfighters (Alterman, 2012). More than 90% of DOD FFRDC funding comes out of 
DOD programs appropriations, programs that FFRDC supports (U.S. Congress, 1995).  
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Congress established financial ceilings on DOD-appropriated money that could be 
allocated to DOD FFRDC centers. The work emphasis of these centers shifted over the 
years, but the core mission still remains today: responsiveness, objectivity, and most 
important, being a reservoir of knowledge and support for ongoing military missions and 
future requirements. The list below provides today’s FFRDC centers and their sponsoring 
agencies: 
• Department of the Air Force – Aerospace Federally Funded Research and 
Development Center; Project Air Force 
• Department of the Army – Arroyo Center 
• Department of the Navy – Center for Naval Analyses 
• National Security Agency – Center for Communications and Computing 
• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology 
and Logistics – Lincoln Laboratory; National Defense Research Institute; 
National Security Engineering Center; Software Engineering Institute. 
(Master Government List of Federally Funded R&D Centers, 2016)  
b.  DOD Laboratories 
The Defense Laboratory Enterprise (DLE) organization was created during World 
War II to enhance combat capabilities. This organization encompassed all the defense 
laboratories that were operated by the Navy, Air Force, and Army.  
In 1946, the United States Office of Naval Research (ONR) was established. ONR 
was the main sponsor of fundamental research performed by U.S. researchers. ONR was 
established “in recognition of the need to plan, encourage, and support basic research in 
our universities, our in-house laboratories, and the private industrial groups in those areas 
of knowledge that seem to be most relevant to long-range Navy requirements” 
(Leitenberg, 2000, p. 16). 
The research performed by ONR was mission-oriented and supported naval 
operations. Some of the basic research conducted at that time was related to remote 
sensing of the sea surface, acoustics, deep moored and drifting buoys, etc. 
The Air Force established their research organization, Air Force Office of 
Scientific Research (AFOSR), in 1951 with the objective of engaging in “contracts with 
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educational institutions for research in broad general fields on problems which, without 
being directed toward definite applications, are of definite interest to the Air Force” 
(Leitenberg, 2000, p. 17). 
By 1976, the Department of Defense had 114 laboratories: Army had 50, Navy 
had 35 and Air Force had 29. R&D activities performed in these labs were coordinated 
through the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) (Leitenberg, 2000, p. 23). 
By 1990, the budget for the government-owned, government operated (GOGO) 
R&D activities was $ 8.5B with almost 45% spent in house on specific technical research 
programs. 65% of the budget was contracted out to FFRDC labs, defense contractors, and 
universities. From 1985 (with a budget of $390B) through 1995 (budget of $295B), the 
defense budget dropped 35% (United States General Accounting Office Washington, 
D.C., 20548, 1995). This significant decline in defense budget during this period was a 
result of the end of Cold War. In 1989, DOD revealed the new weapons systems 
acquisition process. This new acquisition process shielded the defense R&D from 
substantial budget cuts, and thus, R&D spending declined only 12% during three years. 
With the focus toward consolidation in DOD R&D infrastructure (laboratories and 
personnel) in 1991, through the Defense Authorization Act, Congress instructed all 
agencies to reassess their operations, cut back the R&D workforce by 20%, revisit DOD 
R&D laboratory missions and functions, and close or combine some of the laboratories 
until 1995. The intent of the consolidation and downsizing of laboratories and reduction 
in the civilian workforce was to (1) reduce cost, and (2) achieve higher quality and 
improve effectiveness. As a result of the direction provided by Congress, the Air Force 
restructured all its laboratories into four and assigned them divisions per product; Army 
and Navy also proceeded with realignment of R&D facilities and closed some of the labs 
while consolidating others.  
Defense R&D laboratories are a pillar for technological development and 
supporting infrastructure that helps researchers accomplish their work. The Defense 
Laboratory Enterprise organization allows DOD to maintain a strong core technical base 
and provides the military community with the technical competency and support to 
achieve their mission and be the most technologically advanced military.  
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Presently, the defense R&D laboratories are located across twenty-two states and 
employ over 38,000 researchers, engineers, and computer scientists and over 67,000 
employees. As of 2016, the numbers of labs per agency are listed below: 
• Navy: 26 labs 
• Air Force: 15 labs 
• Army: 36 labs 
Re-evaluation of each laboratory’s mission resulted from specific technical needs 
required by the military. Research programs and activities overseen by DLE are mission-
driven and account for over $30B of work per year. Research done in-house by DOD 
researchers as compared to that performed by universities, FFRDC labs, and defense 
contractors has a 50/50 distribution. In addition to research performed for the military, 
the labs are required under the technology transfer initiative, to converge non-sensitive 
intellectual property applications that are developed specifically for the military into 
solutions that could be transferred into the public sector.  
Two of the top research agencies within DOD are Defense Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (DARPA) and Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA). Both 
agencies are under the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). DARPA and DTRA 
fund and oversee programs performed by non-DOD researchers and external laboratories. 
Currently, DARPA has 219 government employees and the organization’s budget for 
FY15 was $2.9B. 
Table 1 shows the Federal obligations for research, by agency and performer for 
FY 2010 (dollars in millions). Preliminary Federal obligations for research, by agency 






Table 1.   FFRDC R&D Obligations per Agency, FY2010.   
      Extramural 
      United States and U.S. territories   














Department of Defense 7,065.4 2,121.1 2,714.3 81.9 1,830.8 59.9 176.8 27.9 1.8 50.5 
Defense agencies and activities 2,443.5 280.6 1,302.3 66.7 638.7 51.7 63.9 16.8 0.0 22.4 
Chemical and Biological Defense 310.0 116.9 89.5 10.9 66.0 2.4 13.7 2.9 0.0 7.4 
Defense Advanced Research   
Projects Agency 1,627.2 92.7 1,047.6 5.3 394.6 19.9 43.9 9.4 0.0 13.5 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency 268.3 37.2 114.4 49.5 53.0 4.2 6.0 2.1 0.0 1.4 
Office of the Secretary of Defense 212.2 30.2 28.5 0.8 124.9 25.0 0.2 2.3 0.0 0.0 
Special Operations Command 25.6 3.5 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
                     Department of the Air Force 1,678.2 735.4 518.0 2.2 374.0 5.1 24.3 4.7 0.7 13.4 
Department of the Army 1,675.1 671.6 577.8 5.3 364.2 0.7 52.4 1.8 0.0 1.0 
Department of the Navy 1,268.4 433.4 316.1 7.5 453.8 2.2 36.0 4.5 1.0 13.6 
                      

































Agency 1,554.0 66.5 987.7 11.5 373.1 12.1 81.8 9.4 0.0 11.7 
Dept. of the 
Air Force 1,630.6 666.0 522.3 1.4 332.2 1.4 84.6 5.4 0.3 16.1 
Dept. of the 
Army 1,456.9 479.3 509.5 0.2 448.5 4.2 6.7 4.0 0.0 4.2 
Dept. of the 
Navy 1,448.4 522.6 328.3 7.4 491.1 16.2 52.8 6.3 1.4 21.9 
Other 
defense 
agencies 811.6 310.3 189.1 38.7 177.5 44.5 11.1 22.9 0.0 17.2 
Source: National Science Foundation, National Center for Science and Engineering Statistics, Survey of Federal Funds for Research and Development, 
FYs 2014–16.  
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As mentioned above, in 2011 there were 40 FFRDC centers supporting DOD 
agencies with a diverse array of research activities. Currently there are only nine DOD 
FFRDC centers.  
In 2010, Congress appropriated $7.6B (2015 inflation-adjusted) to DOD agencies 
for funding intramural and extramural research activities. In 2015 Congress appropriated 
$6.9B for the same research activities, 2.31% less (actual: 10.13% less, inflation-
adjusted) than in 2010 (National Science Foundation, FYs 2010–2012). Examining 
intramural research funding between 2010 and 2015, there was a 3.5% decrease in 
funding (11.2% less, inflation-adjusted) in 2015 than 2010. Obligations for extramural 
research, pertaining to industry and universities, FFRDC saw a 2.5% decrease in 2015 
than 2010 (National Science Foundation, FY2014–2016). The defense R&D funding 
uncertainty throughout the years had a great impact on all FFRDC centers as well as 
DOD R&D facilities. Such budget cuts resulted in most of the FFRDC centers seriously 
decreasing their staff and shutting down their operations, while others became private 
companies. The existence of these research communities, for over 75 years, is owed to 
the particular organizational structure, the relationship with their sponsors, and their 
specialized expertise in niche areas that the federal government or private industry could 
not acquire the know-how to fill. Such expertise to solve time-sensitive defense concerns 
is critical for our national security and military, it is also very difficult and expensive to 
re-create it on short notice (Hruby et al., 2011). 
2. Human Resources 
Research and development is part of the core building blocks of defense. The 
decline in R&D budget in the last few years has raised questions regarding its impact on 
developing new technologies, updating existing platforms, and modernizing the defense 
R&D infrastructure. For the past few years, one of the challenging tasks has been 
maintaining the defense R&D infrastructure and proper force structure that supports 
R&D programs with a defense R&D budget in decline. A robust defense R&D 
competency usually encompasses a highly technical, capable workforce that could 
engage fast and provide solutions to national and international threats, be able to assess 
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the long and short-term country’s defense needs, and work in partnership with the private 
sector R&D. Strong R&D financial health helps to maintain the readiness level and 
strength of the military, while keeping laboratories, universities, personnel and private 
sector engaged and ready to respond to national defense needs. In 1990, the defense R&D 
facilities employed over 100,000 employees (see Table 3); civilian and military with 
more than half being scientists and engineers (Congress, U.S. Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1993). 
Table 3.   Employment in Service RDT&E Facilities.   
Service 
Personnel 
Total R&D T&E Military Civilian Professional Ph.D. 
Army 31,198 21,280 9,918 6,235 24,963 15,593 1,825 
Navy 42,186 32,133 10,053 4,730 37,456 20,234 2,138 
Air Force 27,245 7,390 19,855 17,228 10,017 9,696 775 
Total 100,629 60,803 39,826 28,193 72,436 45,523 4,738 
Source: U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Deputy Director of Defense 
Research and Engineering/Science and Technology, (1992), Department of Defense In-House RDT&E 
Activities: Management Analysis Report for Fiscal Year 1990, Washington, DC: Author, pp. vi–xiv. 
 
As mentioned previously, due to the decline in defense R&D budget and the 1991 
Defense Authorization Act, the DOD agencies were instructed to reduce the R&D 
civilian work force by 20% until 1995 (Congress, U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 
1993). Restructuring the defense R&D organization, particularly due to lack of funding, 
is a challenging task and might require revisiting the defense R&D mission. Lack of 
R&D funding could also have an effect on defense contractors’ workforce assigned to 
support and maintain R&D programs and laboratories. In order to comply with the 
directives provided in the Defense Authorization Act, defense agencies took the 
following steps: 
• Army’s consolidation plan: out of 31,000 employees, eliminate up to 
6,000 civilian personnel and realign 3,000 other jobs throughout the 
agency.  
• Navy’s restructuring plan was to eliminate 2,280 laboratory positions out 
of 42,000 employees. 
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• Air Force eliminated 800 positions out of 27,000 employees working in 
the labs (Congress, U.S. Office of Technology Assessment, 1993). 
Scientists and engineers are the vital components of defense R&D. Maintaining a 
competent R&D workforce requires involving researchers in important and challenging 
R&D projects, ultramodern laboratories and facilities, state-of-the-art test and evaluation 
capabilities, proper training, etc. It also means retaining highly qualified personnel and 
providing the proper means to improve their technical skills. Preserving the skills 
acquired by the personnel working in the R&D laboratories and passing down the 
knowledge to new generations of researchers is also very important in developing future 
military capabilities. Human resource policies emphasize the need for maintaining a 
highly qualified workforce knowledgeable in military technology. As the defense budget 
shrinks, it will also impact the defense contractors supporting R&D projects. This implies 
that DOD R&D laboratories might have to take over more responsibilities (United States 
Congress. Office of Technology Assessment, 1992). 
To reinforce the above statement, let’s examine what Matt Hourihan stated in his 
study “federal R&D in the FY 2016 Budget: An Overview;” “The overall research 
increase is devoted to civilian activities, as defense research would be trimmed across 
multiple accounts.” Further, he mentioned that “Overall Defense Department basic 
research activities would decline by 8.3%, with most of the cuts targeted at the military 
departments” (Hourihan & Parkes, 2016, p. 4). 
We can see from Figure 2, almost $65B of the Defense authority is designated for 
development of the military systems and just $10B for research. The nondefense R&D 
allocation is mostly for basic and applied research activities.  
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Figure 2.  FY2016 R&D Budget Authority. Source: Hourihan & Parkes (2016). 
There are two schools of thought with regard to defense R&D spending and the 
funding level allocated by DOD for research: 
• The first school of thought claims that the United States is spending too 
much on defense R&D, especially on development of high-price, high-
maintenance weapon systems that might not be of great value in conflicts 
such as Iraq and Afghanistan. In his article entitled “Restructuring 
Defense R&D,” Ghoshroy stated that: “In 2011 the United States spent 
$76B annually on defense research and development, an amount that 
exceeds the total defense outlays—not just for R&D, but for all defense 
purposes—of every other country in the world except China” (Ghoshroy, 
2011). The argument is that the basic and applied research, the critical 
components of scientific research, are the smallest of defense R&D 
funding. Ghoshroy further states that “much of what transpires in the name 
of military research and development is not research in the sense that it 
produces scientific and technical knowledge widely applicable inside and 
outside the Defense Department. A large part of defense R&D activity 
revolves around building very expensive gadgets that are often based on 
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unsound technology and frequently fail to perform as required” 
(Ghoshroy, 2011). 
• The second school of thought reinforces the need and benefit of defense 
R&D spending and the positive effect of defense scientific innovation on 
the public sector. 
According to Appelbaum (2012), part of the nation’s wealth is a result of “the 
Pentagon’s unmatched record in developing technologies with broad public benefits—
like the internet, jet engines and satellite navigation—and then encouraging private 
companies to reap the rewards” (Appelbaum, 2012). It is also claimed that reducing the 
Pentagon’s budget and spending less on defense R&D will have a negative impact on 
economic growth and that it will increase unemployment. There are differences of 
opinion regarding defense R&D being the main contributor to the economic growth and 
that DOD is the main sponsor of funding R&D. It appears that the role of DOD being the 
main promoter and user of innovation is unanimously accepted; although some scientists 
maintain that for the past ten years, the commercial industry is spending almost twice as 
much on research than the federal government. 
Despite the differences in opinion of the value or cost of government spending on 
R&D, history has shown tremendous societal benefits and technological advancements 
which have resulted from these types of investments (both government and commercial). 
Also, while political support is not consistent for R&D, it is apparent that economic 
benefits are also derived from the stimulus of R&D activities by the government 
(Alterman, 2012). 
C. SUCCESSFUL RESEARCH PROJECTS 
During World War II, both sides were pushed to break their R&D infrastructure 
and innovate so as to outwit their opponents with new military technologies. With regard 
to inventions, WWII produced new technologies that are being used even today. Some of 
the military research and development performed during the War were the foundation for 
post-war technologies developed by the industry and used by civilians every day. 
Listed below there are several military research discoveries that were invented 
during WWII and transitioned into the private sector after the war (Finnamore, 2015). 
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Jet Engine 
During World War II, a German engineer designed and developed the first jet 
engine to be used for a jet fighter to fly in combat. The design of the engine was very 
inefficient, using a lot of fuel. During the same time in the United Kingdom, another 
engineer invented his own version of a jet engine, but because of lack of speed, it 
couldn’t be used in combat. General Electric, in collaboration with Pratt & Whitney, 
redesigned the jet engine, but it was Lockheed that perfected the jet engine that was used 
in the first American operational jet fighter. This military wartime invention was 
transitioned to the private sector, such that by 1953, the jet engine was used by 
commercial airplanes like the Boeing 707 and Douglas DC-8.  
The Pressurized Cabin 
This invention allowed pilots to fly at high altitude without an oxygen mask. The 
first plane with pressurized cabin was the B-29 Superfortress introduced by the U.S. in 
1944. This invention was perfected and used in air transportation by passenger planes. 
Radar 
Based on Heinrich Hertz’s discovery, proving that radio waves are reflected by 
hard objects, British scientists developed Range and Direction Finding (RDF) technology 
for airplane detection. RDF provided an early warning and allowed Britain to detect 
incoming German bombers. The U.S. renamed the technology “RADAR” that stands for 
Radio Detection and Ranging. The development of the cavity magnetron by Bell 
Telephone Laboratories in 1940 allowed for increased accuracy and smaller size of Radar 
systems. These improvements allowed Allies to install Radar on planes. Radar systems 
are used today in many different applications by the civilian and military. 
Radio Navigation 
During WWII Robert Dippy developed Gee-H, a radio-based navigation system, 
which was designed to be used by for more than one plane at the same time. Gee-H was 
deployed on bombers to guide them when flying into enemy territory and to locate 
targets. The system did not  have any broadcast subsystem required to be on board of the 
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plane. An oscilloscope on board the plane receiving signals from three ground sources 
allowed the plane’s crew to calculate location of the plane. After the war, Dippy worked 
on a Long Range Navigation (LORAN) system that used similar principles to those 
implemented in Gee-H system. LORAN was used until it was replaced by GPS.   
Cryptographic device 
Enigma and Lorentz devices were developed by Germans to encrypt and decrypt 
the communications among the troops. Colossus was the first computer that could be 
programmed and used to decode German communications. The technology used in this 
computer was used later for the development of modern computers. 
Atomic bomb 
Potential nuclear development and threats of Axis powers was a large concern for 
the U.S. in 1940. The Manhattan Project started in 1942 to develop the atomic bomb and 
involved more than thirty research facilities throughout the U.S. The two atomic bombs 
were built in Los Alamos. The atomic bomb was a significant scientific discovery and 
became the foundation for the nuclear energy development. 
V-2  
The V-2 guided intercontinental ballistic missile developed by Germany was the 
groundwork for later development of modern rockets, satellite communications, and the 
development of GPS.  
Some other top inventions and discoveries during the WWII were penicillin, 
synthetic oil and rubber, laser, the dynamo-powered torch, and the Jerrycan—most of 
them still available today (Finnamore, 2015). 
Research and development discoveries during the war, along with technologies 
generated during that period, would not make up for the loss of so many lives. However, 
significant losses were a key driver behind development efforts, motivating continued 
commitment and investment in both private and government sectors. Another positive, 
long-term aspect of the research effort completed during that period of time constituted 
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the foundation for many technologies developed during the post-cold war and many that 
we still use today. 
GPS space-based positioning system was another successful DOD program that 
started in 1973. Military requirements that triggered DOD development and deployment 
of GPS included 24 hour and all-weather-conditions navigation, and worldwide 
positioning capability. GPS technology was based on advanced rapid development in 
electronic systems, artificial satellite development, radio frequency generators improved 
equipment, and the atomic frequency standards. The satellites that are part of the GPS 
constellation are networked together providing worldwide coverage for military and 
civilian users with GPS equipment.    
This innovative GPS communications technology has had a similar impact on the 
user community as has the World Wide Web (WWW). The breadth of application of GPS 
technology has implications in domains such as aerospace, transportation, space, etc.  
D. SUCCESSFUL R&D ON FAILED PROJECTS 
There are many examples and instances where failed/canceled programs produce 
successful R&D. One such example is the Army Comanche helicopter program. It is  a 
great example of failure regarding the overall intended system output, yet successful due 
to its quality R&D and R&D’s associated outputs. The Comanche, deemed a failure due 
to cancellation and perceived loss of billions of dollars associated with system 
development, was able to extend many positive outputs from its conducted/sunk R&D 
and resultant prototyping. Resources, personnel, and more specifically, the Portable 
Maintenance Aid (PMA) used to conduct vehicle maintenance were all extended to other 
Army Aviation platforms. The PMA is currently in use on the Army’s unmanned Gray 
Eagle platform, although it has experienced many iterations of improvement and 
increased capability since its Comanche days. 
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III. DOD R&D BUDGET ANALYSIS 
This chapter will present an analysis of DOD R&D budgets since the onset of 
WWII. Overall, DOD R&D budgets, over the last 75 years, have followed a predictable 
pattern. As the U.S. approaches the beginning of conflict engagement (WWII, Cold War, 
Vietnam War, OIF, OEF), DOD R&D budgets increase. During times of long drawn out 
wars (Cold War, Vietnam War), the DOD R&D budgets remain stagnant or decrease. The 
1980s Reagan military build-up is one of the few identifiable reasons for an increase in 
DOD R&D without foreseeable conflict engagement. Figure 1 is used to conduct budget 
analysis from years 1935–1985. 
 
Figure 1.  U.S. Military Expenditures, 1935–1985. Source: Forman (1987) 
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A. ANALYSIS OF U.S. MILITARY R&D EXPENDITURES 
1935–1940 showed a steady growth in military R&D expenditures. The growth 
was fairly linear throughout the five-year period, doubling from $50M to $100M by 
1940. WWII had started, but the U.S. hadn’t become a direct participant in the conflict 
yet:  “In FY38, the total U.S. budget for military research and development was $23M 
and represented only 30% of all federal R&D” (Forman, 1987). This was essentially the 
last year before the U.S. placed increased emphasis on and more funding toward R&D.   
1940–1945 showed a sharp increase, rising from $100M to approximately $4B. 
This coincided with the expanding conflict in WWII, and the U.S.’ direct involvement. 
Within this five-year period, the OSRD was formed (1941) and were afforded essentially 
unlimited resources. The Manhattan Project, bomb, guided missile, and radar were a few 
examples of the projects being researched and executed within the OSRD. In 1945, the 
Military R&D budget took a substantial dip from $4B to $2.5B due to the end of WWII 
and the death of President Roosevelt.   
During this five-year period, military R&D shot up to about 95% of the U.S.’ total 
R&D budget. Military R&D hovered around 80% of the total U.S. R&D budget until 
about 1960.   
1945–1950 showed decline, yet the budget allocation for R&D was still relatively 
high compared to its peak in 1945. The budget continued its decline for the next few 
years, but had an uptick in 1949 and 1950. This uptick correlated to the onset of the Cold 
War. Toward the end of this period, the U.S. was able to determine through its 
intelligence gathering that the Russia was able to develop their own nuclear capability. 
The U.S. and Russia were allies during WWII, but neither side trusted the other. The 
secrecy of the U.S.’ R&D efforts may have worked too well, in that the Russia 
immediately lost whatever trust they had with the U.S. after the deployment of the atomic 
bomb over Hiroshima. General Patton wanted to extend the conflict to take out the 
Russian Red Army at the conclusion of WWII. The animosity between both the U.S. and 
Russia led to the U.S. continuing to allocate R&D funding to bolster National Security in 
case of pending post-WWII conflict. 
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1950–1960 showed continued upward growth in terms of dollar allocation. With 
the U.S. entering the Korean War at the start of the decade, the increasing threat of 
Russia, the onset of the Cold War, and the United States’ devotion to continue to assure 
militaristic success and national defense/security served as motivators to continue the 
uptick of R&D investments. The Mutually Assured Destruction Doctrine between the 
U.S. and Russia may have helped prevent the usage of nuclear warhead capabilities, but it 
certainly required both countries to invest heavily in nuclear research, programs, 
resources to deploy and detonate the weapons, and facility security. The allocation of 
dollars exceeded those from the peak of U.S. involvement in WWII in 1944–1945.   
1960–1990 showed the U.S. maintaining DOD R&D budgets above the $5B mark 
for this 30 year period. There was a downward trend in the early 1960s that changed 
course with a five-year uptick due to the perceived threat associated with the U.S. 
sending more troops to Vietnam, resulting specifically from the Gulf of Tonkin incident. 
During the 1970s, DOD R&D had a downward trend. Multiple presidential 
administrations and a vocalized disapproval from the American people regarding the U.S. 
conflict with Vietnam forced the government’s hand to scale back DOD budgets to levels 
lower than it had been the previous 20 years. The R&D budget had a sharp uptick from 
1980–1985 under President Reagan’s administration. Reagan had a fundamental belief 
that aligned with the Republican mindset with respect to small government and minimal 
spending, yet under his Presidency, federal R&D increased along with DOD R&D, with 
significantly higher increases on the DOD R&D side. In 1981, federal R&D and DOD 
R&D were relatively equal in dollar allocation ($15B and $17B respectively). By the end 
of 1988, federal R&D increased to approximately $18B, while DOD R&D increased to 
$46B (Garfield,1987).     
1990–2000 started with a reduction in DOD R&D, while federal R&D continued 
to increase, illustrated in Figure 2. DOD R&D reductions began just before the Gulf War 
started in 1990. While the conflict lasted six months, the immediate decline and relative 
flat line of DOD R&D budgets throughout the decade coincided with military 
deployment in many different locations around the world for missions to dissolve ethnic 
cleansing to peace keeping. In 1996, the overall DOD budget was 40% lower than it was 
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in 1985 (Wooley, 2006). DOD R&D spending tends to decrease while the U.S. is not 
engaged in active conflict. Overall, federal R&D spending remained stagnant and flat 
together with DOD R&D. Figure 2 also shows American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act (ARRA) dollars for both defense and non-defense dollars. 
 
Figure 2.  Federal R&D Trends. Source: AAAS (2016), http://www.aaas.org/
page/historical-trends-federal-rd. 
2000–2016 experienced a significant increase in R&D spending, as the overall 
DOD budget increased due to the 9/11 terror attacks. DOD R&D spending increased in 
2002 in response to the attack, with intentions of beginning an offensive conflict with 
Iraq and Afghanistan. Both the DOD R&D budget and the overall DOD budget increased 
significantly just before and after the start of Middle East operations, which began in 
2003. The DOD budget went from $328B in 2002 to its peak in 2006 at $535B 
(Infoplease.com. Source: Center for Defense Information). The spending directly 
 31 
associated with the war efforts (GWOT (Global War On Terrorism) and OCO (Overseas 
Contingency Operations) dollars) aren’t even included in these numbers. The GWOT/
OCO dollars had requirements associated with their spending, specifically disallowing 
the funds to be used for R&D. The funds were for direct support of the war effort, and 
intended for procurement and Operating and Support (O&S) purposes. DOD R&D surged 
to unprecedented heights, peaking at about $95B in 2010 just before the initial 
drawdowns in Iraq.   
This 16-year period continues to show the pattern that has been identified in 
previously analyzed periods. DOD R&D becomes re-invigorated in the years preceding 
the onset of U.S. participation in conflict/war. During this period, it reached and hovered 
around the $95B mark until 2010, which coincided with the initial war drawdown in Iraq. 
The DOD R&D budget decreased to levels that were still higher than they were, then 
achieved historic peaks in the mid-1980s. Based on this trend, one could predict that the 
current DOD R&D funding baseline will remain relatively stagnant until the next 
anticipated conflict occurs. One could even predict that if there is a sudden surge in the 
DOD R&D budget, the U.S. is likely to engage in conflict within 2–3 years.  
B. ASSOCIATIONS BETWEEN R&D AND GDP 
As shown in Figure 3, the United States has experienced significant, consistent 
growth over the last 75 years. Throughout each decade, the net result has been positive 
growth with some low spots or negative growth sprinkled throughout. The growth may 
not be year-over-year growth, but growth nonetheless. 
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Figure 3.  Real GDP Growth. Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis (n.d.),  
http://www.bea.gov/national/xls/gdplev.xls. 
The early 1940s showed double digit increases in GDP year after year for the first 
four years of the decade. This corresponds to the buildup in defense resources and the 
U.S. participation in WWII. For three years following the conclusion of WWII, the GDP 
decreased due to a decrease in defense spending and an inflation rate of over 18% 
(Amadeo, 2016a). The next 20 years showed consistent, steady growth, in which only 
two years did not experience growth, and those years were both less than 1% negative 
growth.  The worst eight-year period was 1974–1982, in which it experienced four years 
of negative growth. During this timeframe, DOD spending was cut and left flat during the 
Carter Administration. Conversely, under the Reagan administration, GDP growth was 
no less than 3.5% each year. This coincided with Reagan’s Star Wars initiative, military 
buildup, and increases in R&D. The period 1990–2007 experienced consistent growth 
under Clinton and Bush.   
 33 
With peace time under Clinton, and emphasis on the War on Terror under Bush, 
there aren’t significant spikes or lulls to reflect a change in GDP with respect to increases 
in military spending and investments in R&D. During WWII and the increased military 
spending in the 1980s, there were sizable increases in GDP growth. But this appears to be 
simply correlation, as throughout this 75-year period, through periods of active conflict, 
preparation to engage in conflict, and peace time, GDP does notincrease or decrease 
respective to DOD spending and associated increases in DOD R&D expenditures. GDP 
grew and fell many times at differing slopes relative to DOD R&D allocation and 
investments. GDP sensitivities seem to be more related to the economy, recessions, and 
singular events. 
What about correlation/causation from the other perspective?  Does output from 
R&D impact GDP?  The simple answer is yes; successes realized and gained from R&D 
do translate to economic growth. Significant discoveries and innovations, such as the 
transistor, GPS, ARPANET, and nuclear fission/fusion clearly increased human 
efficiencies and provided economic growth for the United States and foreign countries. 
The direct and indirect impacts aren’t defined and metricized. There’s an understanding 
that these types of discoveries have unquantifiable impacts on the population and a non-
metricized Return on Investment (ROI). Governments and corporations partake in R&D 
to reap the benefits of both direct and indirect discoveries and successes, knowing that 
outputs from these investments may not be realized in the short term. 
C. DOD R&D PERCENTAGES RELATIVE TO OVERALL FEDERAL R&D 
The U.S. began devoting significant attention and applied funding toward the 
general notion of R&D in the late 1930s. At the same time the U.S. was preparing to 
enter WWII, it was also investing R&D dollars to support foreign led, non-militaristic 
research initiatives. From the early 1930s to 1940, DOD R&D encompassed just under a 
third of the overall federal R&D budget (Figure 3). From 1940–1960, DOD R&D surged 
to and remained at approximately 90% of the total federal R&D budget (Figure 3). The 
DOD R&D budget remained a high percentage of the federal R&D budget for such a 
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long period of time due primarily to WWII and the lingering distrust of Russia, leading to 
the onset of the Cold War.   
During the 1960s, the overall R&D percentages shifted in favor of federal R&D, 
as there was renewed interest during this time to invest research into non-defense entities 
and ideas. DOD R&D and federal R&D marched forward at an even pace for the next 20 
years until 1980. President Carter’s defense cuts kept the DOD R&D budget lower and 
flat during the 1970s than in previous years, causing the DOD R&D budget to remain in 
line with the federal R&D budget.   
Following the conclusion of the Vietnam War, the 1980s ushered in a new 
mentality to revitalize the U.S. The Reagan administration allocated more dollars toward 
the rebuilding of the military. Not only were the defense budgets higher, in order to 
directly combat “low morale, low pay, outdated equipment, and practically zero 
maintenance on what did exist,” (“Ronald Reagan’s Military Buildup,” n.d.), Reagan also 
invested heavily into defense research. Under Reagan, a research program called “Star 
Wars” was hatched to defend the U.S. against Russian nuclear warheads utilizing a 
system that was resident in space. Not only was it a futuristic research project, but it 
helped the U.S. “circumvent the UN’s Anti-Ballistic (ABM) Treaty” by having the 
defense system not resident on Earth (“Ronald Reagan’s Military Buildup,” n.d.). As 
Reagan ended his second presidential term in 1989, he left with a military budget “43% 
higher than the total expenditure during the height of the Vietnam War” (“Ronald 
Reagan’s Military Buildup, n.d.). Reagan was able to increase defense spending without 
directly impacting a fragile economy, as the expenditures sent the U.S. into even more 
significant debt. However, the investments made in research during the 1980s have 
attributed to technological advancements and capability currently being employed by the 
military in 2016. 
As Reagan increased military budgets, allowing for DOD R&D budgets to 
increase, the federal R&D budget suffered from a dramatic decrease to start the 1980s, 
but had a consistent increase from 1983 through the early 1990s. In 1987, the DOD R&D 
budget under Reagan peaked at around $75B. During this same time, federal R&D was in 
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the midst of its own growth period, but still lagged behind the DOD R&D budget. The 
DOD R&D budget occupied almost 70% of the overall U.S. R&D budget. 
After a flat period for a couple of years during the Gulf War, the DOD R&D 
budget encountered a steady decline followed by a flat line for the remainder of the 1990s 
under the Clinton administration. After the 9/11 attacks on the U.S., the percentage of 
DOD R&D soared and accounted for approximately 60% of U.S. R&D by 2007. The 
percentage would have been higher, but the federal R&D grew at a similar rate from 
1996–2003, and flat lined during the DOD R&D growth as the U.S. entered into conflict 
with Iraq and Afghanistan. DOD R&D has dropped sharply since the Iraq drawdown. 
Since 2012, DOD R&D has been flat, accounting for just over 50% of overall R&D. 
In summary, DOD R&D budgets have accounted for more than 50% of the 
overall research budgets since 1940, with the exception of a 2–3 year window in the late 
1970s, where federal R&D spending exceeded that of the defense department. During the 
short amount of time that federal R&D spending actually exceeded DOD R&D spending, 
the federal R&D budget was less than 10% higher. The emphasis has always been on 
DOD R&D due to military benefits, national security benefits, and the historical ability to 
extend discoveries and successes to both the U.S. and the world populace. 
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IV. GPS CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
As successful as GPS has been on both the battlefield and in worldwide civilian 
life, the end state wasn’t realized when the idea of GPS was identified as something 
needed to transition from concept to capability. This section will be prefaced by an 
overview, followed by analysis to the following questions/statements: 
• Why was GPS technology developed? 
• What was the military’s first application of satellite communication? 
• What prior research was conducted to help mature the GPS system? 
• What other technologies did the military benefit from due to GPS? 
• What are the benefits to GPS outside of the military? 
• What are the economic benefits to GPS? 
• How GPS demonstrates DOD R&D’s ability/adeptness to adapt to 
paradigm shifts. 
These analysis questions will directly answer the secondary research questions 
presented in the introduction of this research.  
A. OVERVIEW 
“The Global Positioning System (GPS) is a U.S.-owned utility that provides users 
with positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) services” (Gov, G. P. S. 2012). GPS is a 
constellation of network satellites that constitutes the space segment of the GPS system. 
Currently, there are 31 GPS satellites flying in the medium Earth orbit; 24 of them are 
active and considered part of the core operational GPS constellation. These satellites are 
orbiting the earth at an altitude of over 12,000 miles. The GPS satellites are controlled 
and monitored by 17 ground facilities networked together and located throughout the 
world. The last segment of the GPS system is the User segment that includes the user 
community and equipment used to communicate with the satellites by receiving the 
signals and calculating the user’s position. The user community who are receiving the 
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critical positioning information are both civilian and military users around the world. 
(Gps.gov, 2012). 
B. WHY WAS GPS DEVELOPED? 
The notion of GPS was not conceived during a round table discussion of good 
ideas to focus on and devote research toward developing an end state solution to benefit 
U.S. soldiers. Actually, it happened almost by accident. In 1957, two physicists at the 
Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Lab (APL) (a laboratory under the Office of Scientific 
Research and Development focused on military research) decided to test whether they 
could detect the emission of microwave signals from the recently launched Russian 
Sputnik satellite. Fortunately, due to the heavily competitive technological landscapes 
between Russia and the U.S., Russia launched the Sputnik with a regularly emitting 
signal to provide proof that their satellite was, in fact, in orbit (Johnson, 2010b). These 
two APL physicists quickly realized they could obtain a heartbeat signature from the 
satellite while it was in orbit in space. As they started recording the frequency of signals 
originating from the Sputnik, they realized that the associated time signature wasn’t 
consistent (Johnson, 2010b). They successfully utilized the Doppler Effect to determine 
the entire Sputnik orbit pattern. This was the first iteration of GPS, as they learned and 
demonstrated the use of a ground receiver to determine the location of a satellite. 
The next iteration of GPS occurred shortly after this discovery was made. The two 
physicists’ supervisor asked if they could determine the opposite of what they just 
demonstrated. Can the satellite determine the location of an object on Earth?  After a 
quick confirmation that yes, the bi-directional discovery of space and earth objects could 
identify each other’s locations via signals from the satellite, the first direct application/
requirement for militarized use of GPS was born (Johnson, 2010b). 
C. THE FIRST MILITARY APPLICATION OF GPS 
The military had growing interest in tracking and guiding munitions and missiles 
using satellite guided positioning. Leveraging the new discovery of tracking these 
weapons via satellite was intriguing. The specific use case that helped transition the 
notion of tracking objects via satellites to our current instantiation of GPS involved 
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launching missiles from mobile submarines. Due to the constant changes in location, 
launching missiles from submarines was difficult, if not impossible, in the late 1950s. 
With this requirement, research began to develop the system of satellites and ground 
stations/receivers to identify positions of objects on earth. 
Less than 3 years after the raw discovery of satellite communication, the research 
transitioned to a Navy Program of Record called Transit in 1959 (Sullivan, 2012). The 
program initially launched 6 satellites into orbit to provide navigational intelligence to 
Navy Polaris submarines. Due to the circumference of the Earth being larger than the 
range of 6 satellites in orbit, the satellite population was increased to 10. 
D. PRIOR RESEARCH EFFORTS LEADING TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
GPS 
Prior to 1973, when GPS design and deployment began, there were years of 
studies and research that produced different experimental positioning and navigation 
systems that constitute the foundation for current GPS system.  
In the past, primitive tribes and mariners used celestial-based positioning 
techniques for navigation. They used angular measurements of the stars to guide them 
during travel. The magnetic compass was another practical instrument used in the past for 
orientation by sea navigators. 
After radio frequency generators became available, The Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology developed and tested a navigational system that had increased accuracy and a 
range of approximately 1500 miles. In 1943, U.S. Navy took over the project, and the 
Long Range Navigation (LORAN) program was born. The all-weather LORAN-A 
system was deployed in Europe and North Africa in 1944 with the main goal of providing 
long distance radio navigation support to U.S. forces and its Allies. The system was 
extremely useful during night bombing operations. Throughout the years, both the 
government and private companies joined forces and improved the LORAN system’s 
technical capabilities. By 1962, a new version of the system, LORAN-C, became the only 
long range navigational system that was compliant with the international requirements of 
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the time (Jansky & Bailey 1962). In 1974, civilians were permitted to use LORAN-C 
capabilities. 
The Decca Navigator System was another long range radio navigation system 
developed during World War II. This system was installed in military and civilian 
aircrafts, ships, and boats allowing them to locate their position (Jansky & Bailey 1962).    
The development of Line-of-Site (LOS) communications systems allowed 
researchers to study and assess new alternatives for navigation aid capabilities. Between 
1959 and 1960, the Navy had requirements to locate ballistic missile submarines and 
ships, while the Air Force was seeking to develop a radio navigation system to guide their 
Minuteman missiles. Transit was the first low-altitude satellite navigation system 
developed by the Navy in 1960. The Transit constellation had only six satellites and a 
few ground stations. Transit system had several drawbacks, however: it was very slow, it 
took a long time to receive a signal from the satellite, and it could not be used for high-
speed platforms. Timation was the follow up satellite development created by the Naval 
Research Lab, in 1967, where high-stability clocks and 2D navigation were provisioned 
with each Timation satellite (Sullivan, 2012).     
This development was based on the scientific discoveries made after the launch of   
Sputnik satellite and Doppler Effect theory. The studies and the research performed for 
the development of the TRANSIT system set the stage for future GPS systems. 
During the same time period, the Army worked independently in developing the 
same/similar satellite- based radio navigation and positioning capability. In 1964, the first 
Sequential Correlation of Range (SECOR) satellite was launched. By the end of 1966, 
eight SECOR navigation satellites were launched by the Army (Nichols, 1974). 
In 1963, the DOD requested Aerospace Corporation to perform studies for 
defining space capabilities and applications to meet national defense needs. In the same 
year, the Air Force initiated research in developing technologies needed to determine the 
location of aircrafts. Later, this effort became known as the System 621B program. 
Research performed by the Aerospace Corporation caught the attention of the Air Force, 
which worked on 3D navigation system and pseudorandom noise (PRN) technologies that 
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were part of the System 621B program. The research results and techniques developed by 
Aerospace were used within this System 621B design (Pace et al.,1995). 
All disjointed activities pertaining to the development of satellite navigation 
systems performed by the Army, Navy, and Air Force had the same objectives and goals, 
but unfortunately, no joint requirements. In 1968, the DOD created the Navigation 
Satellite Executive Group (NAVSEG). NAVSEG was tasked by the DOD to define the 
requirements for the new satellite navigation system and to define the new design for the 
satellite constellation and ground stations infrastructure. In 1973, DOD approved the 
development of NAVSTAR Global Positioning System in a three-phased approach (Pace 
et al., 1995). 
It took 16 years of research activities, prototyping and development from all three 
DOD Services and industry partners to finalize the satellite-location mapping system 
design that included the technical characteristics and features required by the military. 
Achieving such a remarkable development was possible due to the DOD’s financial 
commitment to invest in positioning and navigation research and development throughout 
all these years. The DOD’s consistency and focus allowed the various entities and 
research groups to leverage emerging tools and information from their independent 
efforts – even though not always collaboratively—to challenge existing capabilities and 
continue an aggressive approach to build on the industry’s efforts, resulting in new 
capabilities and applications (Pace et al., 1995).  
E. GPS SCHEDULE AND BUDGETS  
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) understood the importance of 
developing GPS capabilities for the warfighters and provided continuous support 
throughout all phases of the program. Collaboration among DOD Agencies, FFRDC 
organizations, and defense contractors was critical in the success of the GPS program.  
In 1973, the DOD approved Phase 1 of the NAVSTAR GPS program. The first 
phase was funded $100 million, and its schedule and execution included the following 
activities and objectives: 
• Finalizing joint requirements and systems’ design 
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• Development of four satellites 
• Development of the launch vehicles 
• Construction of a prototype ground satellite facility 
• Develop/Test/Implement three types of receivers 
• Proof of concept of space navigation system through testing. (Pace et al., 
1995).  
During 1974 and 1977, two experimental satellites were launched. These two 
satellites were used for a short period of time for extensive testing. After the DOD 
successfully demonstrating the use of atomic clocks, spread-spectrum techniques for 
radio navigation & positioning capabilities, as well as nuclear detonation sensors, the 
GPS program received approval with the development of Block I satellite development.  
However, funding stability for the GPS program became an issue starting in 1980. 
GPS capabilities and benefits were not well understood by the military during that time 
since GPS was not then considered a weapon system. The GPS program was forced to 
reassess the design of the satellite constellation due to budget cuts during FY81 and 
FY86, when the DOD decided to cut $500 million out of the GPS budget. The redesigned 
system included only 18 satellites instead of the 24 satellites proposed initially.    
The GPS program was also delayed almost two years with the launch of second-
generation satellites (Block II) due to a Space Shuttle Challenger accident that happened 
in 1986. After 1989, twenty-three (23) Block II GPS were launched. By the end of 1995, 
the GPS constellation consisted of 24 operational satellites (Pace et al., 1995).  
F. SUCCESS OF GPS TECHNOLOGY USE DURING WAR 
When Operation Desert Shield started in 1990, only 16 GPS satellites (out of 24) 
were operational. GPS receivers were not available to Army soldiers during that time due 
to limited availability. Only Army reconnaissance units and unit commanders were 
furnished GPS receivers. Special Operations groups used this technology prior to the 
beginning of this war and they knew how valuable it was especially in drab desert 
environment. The Army quickly realized how important GPS technology was for 
 43 
deployed forces and did their best equipping as many units as possible with GPS 
receivers during the conflict. Lieutenant General Frederick Franks, the VII Corps 
Commander, stated “They [(GPS receivers)] were invaluable in avoiding fratricide and 
allowing accurate navigation and artillery fires” (Dissinger, 2008).  
During the conflict, GPS was used by the military in precision weapon delivery, 
help in landing aircraft on improvised fields, positioning troops, among many others. 
GPS capabilities were critical in helping the U.S. warfighters and U.S. Allies to win the 
conflict in just four days.  
G. WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF GPS SUCCESSES RESULTANT 
FROM R&D INVESTMENTS? 
1. The Compounding Military Benefit 
With the launch of Sputnik in 1957, the floodgates opened for associated research, 
development, and production activities to field a satellite based system that could orbit 
earth and communicate with receivers on earth. The resultant advancements in 
technology went beyond the scope of just a satellite architecture. The results were 
compounded, with both the U.S. military and civilians reaping benefit. In this specific 
case, worldwide civilian life has also reaped the benefit. The subsequent paragraphs will 
discuss some of the secondary impacts of a singular discovery, which supports the 
importance of continued future emphasis on R&D and defending R&D in times of budget 
cuts and fiscal uncertainty. 
The development of the satellites themselves had to go through multiple design 
iterations. The original design utilized requirements to integrate with a Thor-Ablestar 
rocket. The integration/collaboration between rocket and satellite were the first of its kind 
in the U.S.. With a rocket failure occurring on Transit 1 in 1959, it was renamed to 
Transit 1A, as Transit 1B had a successful launch in 1960 (“Transit Satellite,” Wikipedia, 
n.d.). As more Transit satellites were launched into orbit, they were continuously refined 
with increased capability. The refinement and continuous testing paved the way for 
today’s reliable and highly capable satellites. 
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As the satellite technology was being developed at APL, rocket technology 
experienced rapid growth, as it had a significant forcing function as an enabler for 
satellites. The Thor-Ablestar rocket experienced failure with Transit 1A, but was quickly 
modified to compensate for the experienced failures. In less than a year, the Transit 1B 
was successfully launched via the improved Thor-Ablestar (The JHU Gazette Satellites, 
Rockets, and More, 2010). Even with success, the Thor rocket was used as a short term 
means to launch and demonstrate satellite communication technology. Upon successful 
completion of the testing and proof of concept through 1965, the Thor-Ablestar was 
replaced by the Scout rocket as the long term solution to launch Transit satellites.   
With the utilization of the mature Scout rocket, the Transit satellite had to endure 
a re-design in order to integrate with the Scout, specifically regarding shedding Transit 
weight and replacing some electrical components that had little susceptibility to enduring 
damage from vibration (“Transit Satellite,” Wikipedia, n.d.). As the rocket technology 
matured, the satellite technology needed to catch up, forcing refinements that gained 
fabrication and endurance efficiencies. Aside from the enhancements associated with 
rocket integration, each Transit launch leveraged on lessons learned from the previous 
launch. As confidence grew, they increased the capability and troubleshot problems. With 
each launch, different classified payloads would be attached to the satellite as extended/
new capability was tested. These back and forth forcing functions directly impacted the 
rapid maturation of these technologies throughout the 1960s and 1970s.   
ARPA, later known as DARPA, was created in 1958 in direct response to the 
Russian launch of the Sputnik. One of ARPA’s first projects was the development of 
Transit with the APL. Due to both ARPA’s and APL’s proper level of funding and 
resource allocation, these organizations were able to conduct proof of concept testing, 
and extend concepts to real world testing. More importantly, these organizations were 
afforded the opportunity to test emerging technology with the notion that failure will 
assist in progress, rather than serving as a hindrance. These organizations were not 
threatened by failure. The early successes associated with the Transit program helped 
reinforce the solid decision in standing up the ARPA organization. Without this program, 
and an upfront injection of confidence regarding immediate successful R&D, one could 
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ponder whether ARPA would have withstood the test of time and opportunity to defend 
its reason for being. Today’s federal R&D faces heavy public scrutiny for publicized 
failures regarding high visibility initiatives. There’s little tolerance or patience for failure. 
As Transit approached the 1970s, it was embraced by all branches of the military 
and renamed NAVSTAR (Sullivan, 2012). From a military perspective, one of the large 
successes of NAVSTAR was the joint deployed nature of the system, in that all of the 
joint forces could utilize the technology. This is a significant victory in terms of cross 
platform interoperability, lack of proprietary nature, and cost sharing, allowing for 
widespread adoption of the technology.   
As evolution continued into the 1980s, NAVSTAR, which was formally renamed 
GPS, increased the satellite footprint to 24 satellites. As these new satellites were 
launched into orbit, other R&D efforts were able to leverage the success of the GPS 
infrastructure. The atomic clock and a sensor array capable of detecting the launch of 
nuclear weapons were co-located payloads on the latter launched satellites (Sullivan, 
2012).   
The military has extended its use of GPS and satellite communication to modern 
day technology on the battlefield. Command and control of UAVs, like the Army’s Gray 
Eagle, occurs via satellites, allowing for global, non-line of sight operations. These same 
UAVs also rely on GPS for autonomous flight behaviors and return to home procedures. 
GPS also “steers” precision guided Joint Direct Attack Munitions (Hallion, 1995). 
Ground equipment utilizes commercialized Google Maps and proprietary maps to fuse 
digital imagery with global positioning.   
The discovery of today’s GPS, through significant R&D and testing, failures, and 
resultant fixes and re-tests, directly contributed to the iterations of the aforementioned 
technological areas and organizational creations. Utilizing GPS to understand locations of 
personnel, air and ground vehicles, or guide munitions on the battlefield is used as a 
standard today. GPS is an invaluable tool. 
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2. Benefits Beyond the Military 
GPS only became today’s instantiation of GPS due to continued R&D throughout 
the longevity of the Transit program. It evolved throughout that program, throughout the 
NAVSTAR iteration, and continued evolution to its current GPS state as surrounding 
technology evolved, more resources were devoted to the ecosystem, and humans 
designed supporting hardware and software to utilize the infrastructure. 
In 1983, President Reagan allowed the use of GPS outside of the military for 
commercial aircraft (Sullivan, 2012). This extended beyond aviation, and eventually 
private industry began developing and selling handheld GPS devices. GPS then began 
spreading beyond domestic U.S. use, rapidly experiencing worldwide adoption. This 
began the development of civilian applications and adoption of GPS technology. 
As GPS was initially developed for enhancing military combat capabilities, 
Standard Positioning System (SPS) is the GPS service that is available to civilians. Some 
of the areas where SPS is used include:  
• providing Geodetic control 
• surveying control for Photogrammetric control surveys and mapping 
• identifying offshore drilling location 
• surveying of power lines 
• mining and mineral exploration 
• estimating gravity anomalies using GPS 
• assisting in Harbor navigation 
• offshore positioning: shipping, offshore platforms, fishing boats etc 
• air traffic control 
• scientific surveying 
• measuring ocean waves and the like. (Raju, n.d.) 
With the fusion of digital imagery, maps, and global positioning, the paper map is 
no longer used for navigational purposes. Handheld GPS receivers, smartphones, and 
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navigational units for automobiles have penetrated the worldwide consumer market for 
navigation. Beyond navigational purposes, creative entities have created applications and 
ecosystems predicated on GPS. Geocaching is a game that relies on GPS to find a 
treasure at specific coordinates. A software application called Pokemon GO utilizes GPS 
to catch digital creatures on a smartphone. Google even utilizes your smartphone’s GPS 
to passively collect traffic information and monitor when groups of users all decrease 
speed or cease movement. The results are posted via color coded lines and accurately 
depict the length of traffic congestion on the map.  
The compounding effect of discoveries made resultant from sponsored R&D can 
be extended to the emerging technologies associated with civilian autonomous vehicles, 
ranging from self-driving cars to air vehicles (drones) used for delivering packages. 
Google’s self-driving car project utilizes sensors and algorithms to keep the car within 
the standard lanes on a road, but it utilizes GPS to provide the navigational route to travel 
from origination to destination (Pullen, 2015). Amazon has its own R&D program 
focused on the development of air vehicles that will deliver packages to customers 
utilizing GPS coordinates to determine destinations (Lavars, 2015). While both of these 
technologies utilize GPS as its primary source for navigation, GPS could also be used to 
monitor the real-time locations of any of these sources of autonomy. Extending the notion 
of GPS tracking, police departments are utilizing GPS for real-time police vehicle 
locations (Smith, 2009). When the police department gets a call/request requiring the 
dispatching of a police officer to rectify the situation, the dispatch utilizes GPS to locate 
on a map where the call’s origination point and fuses that data with the GPS location of 
the closest officer to gain the greatest efficiency and response time (Smith, 2009).   
3. GPS Benefits to the U.S. Economy 
Figure 4 represents the U.S.’ economic benefit associated with the utilization of 
GPS for the year 2013. There’s both a range and a mid-range value. For the sake of this 
research, the mid-range value will be referenced. Total economic benefit is $55.8B. The 
$55.8B depicted here is from industries and sectors where tangible realizations in cost 
savings or gains in efficiencies can be calculated (Leveson, 2015).   
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Figure 4.  GPS Benefits to the U.S. Economy. Source: GPS World (n.d.), 
http://gpsworld.com/the-economic-benefits-of-gps 
There’s also intangible benefits to GPS that have been realized. These benefits are 
difficult or impossible to metricize. For instance, after Transit 4B launched in 1961, 
analysts soon discovered that the agreed upon location of Hawaii was actually incorrect 
by approximately 1km (Wade, 1997). Other intangibles to which Return On Investment 
(ROI) is difficult to calculate include leisure activities, safety, environmental efficiencies, 
and improved security postures (Leveson, 2015). The $55.8B metric is effective in 
placing a rolled-up value based on actual cost savings/avoidance metrics, but with the 
aforementioned intangibles, proves to be a significant underestimate. 
GPS technology not only provided the metricized $55.8B of cost savings/
avoidance and benefit, but it also created a new industry within the technology sector. 
Companies were created devoted to associated GPS hardware and/or software 
development, jobs were created to support the companies, and governing boards were 
created to increase capability and ensure the adherence to standards for worldwide 
consumption. The National Space-Based Positioning, Navigation, and Timing Advisory 
Board is one such example of a governing body that provides input to DOD, which is the 
ultimate body that oversees GPS (Leveson, 2015). 
 49 
These aforementioned successes depict the associated successes of the early 
investments in continued development, refinement, and maturation of the GPS program. 
The benefits range from military to civilian, and extend both to metricized costs 
associated with savings/profit due to utilization of GPS, and also some unquantifiable 
examples of GPS use cases.   
H. ADAPTABILITY TO PARADIGM SHIFTS 
A significant foundational reason for the success of GPS does notnecessarily 
revolve around the technological advancement and maturation process enacted over the 
last 50 years. The reason lies more within the structure and environment which harvested 
and fostered the ability to think outside the box and take risks: “APL was a superb 
environment for inquisitive young kids, and particularly so in the Research Center. It was 
an environment that encouraged people to think broadly and generally about task 
problems, and one in which inquisitive kids felt free to follow their curiosity (Johnson,    
2010a).”   
Within the APL in 1957, the physicists responsible for the Sputnik research were 
at the onset of a paradigm shift. Leveraging the success from the Sputnik, APL was able 
to further the technology and apply specific use cases to warrant the continued research 
of the emerging technology. Had APL not been postured (from a personnel, resource, and 
funding perspective) to adequately assess and embrace an impending paradigm shift, GPS 
as we know it today may not have been discovered or implemented. Or maybe it would 
have occurred, but the technology would not be as robust and mature as it is today. This 
statement lends itself to the notion that without proper resources, time is lost and 
unrecoverable. With lost time, the ability to compound and integrate discoveries into 
other established technologies or other discoveries takes longer to realize, if realization 
occurs at all. 
I. HOW DID THE GPS INITIATIVE FLOURISH AS A PROGRAM UNDER 
A ROBUST R&D BUDGET? 
Robust military R&D allows for cutting-edge technological development that 
sentries against challengers’ surprises; it also helps create equilibrium among current 
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warfighters’ technological needs. Robust R&D (through investment) also promotes future 
stability of U.S. defense requirements and their enhancement.  
An analysis regarding what a robust defense R&D budget should entail, and how 
it applies to the GPS discovery and program development: 
• Predictable R&D funding—In the mid to late 1950s, DOD R&D was on 
the uptick (Figure 3). Due to Cold War escalation with Russia, overall 
DOD budgets and DOD R&D budgets were very stable and predictable as 
discussed and analyzed in Chapter III. 
• Support from Federally Funded Research and Development Centers 
(FFRDC) universities and laboratories—The GPS program was jointly 
researched, developed, and tested by many different organizations. APL 
was the main FFRDC involved with the development and execution. Due 
to the expertise residing in an FFRDC, the knowledge and integration was 
easily transferrable to other Federal organizations, both research and 
departments.   
• Cooperation with private sector institutions—APL had significant 
private sector relationships, including Douglas and Aerojet for the 
development of the Thor rocket to send the satellites into space. Likewise, 
two major primes on the Scout consisted of Thiokol and Aerojet, in 
conjunction with NASA. GPS experienced a solid combination of utilizing 
internal expertise, development, and requirements generation along with 
the technical prowess of private corporations to integrate components into 
a system of systems. 
• Well-equipped defense laboratories—Naval Research Laboratory was a 
large influence in the success of the GPS development and deployment. 
Allegany Ballistics Laboratory, originally founded during WWII as a 
laboratory underneath the Office of Scientific Research and Development. 
This rocket development lab was transferred in 1956 to Naval Sea 
Systems Command (“Allegany Ballistics Laboratory,” Wikipedia, n.d). 
Again, the GPS demonstrates solid collaboration between different 
defense laboratories to solve problems.  
• Technological know-how, and the world-class engineering expertise 
and skills of personnel supporting R&D projects—APL had many 
young, talented physicists, scientists, and engineers. The two scientists 
who discovered Sputnik’s radio frequencies were both pursuing technical 
doctorate degrees. These doctorate degrees furthered APL’s world-class 
knowledge and resources, gaining a SME in specific areas. APL was 
properly positioned to hire talented individuals who had some freedom 
and flexibility to conduct research in areas of interest. (United States 
Congress. Office of Technology Assessment, 1992). 
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APL was positioned nicely to be able to both have the appropriate resources to 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
The U.S. is currently postured with many different DOD R&D centers throughout 
the country, focusing on both military applications and civilian applications. These R&D 
centers are actively solving difficult problems, and are also well positioned to quickly 
react to emerging/sudden problems, such as vaccines for Ebola and Zika (Pellerin, 2014). 
It is  critical for the U.S. to continue to emphasize the importance of R&D, especially in 
times of fiscal uncertainty requiring budget cuts. It is imperative that these facilities are 
funded adequately and able to maintain their R&D core competencies, intellectual base, 
technical skills, laboratory infrastructure, etc., to respond quickly and effectively to such 
unexpected technological threats, and thus continue to support the DOD research efforts. 
Today’s problems ranging from advancements in technology to battlefield enhancements 
of weapon systems to medical vaccinations are all beneficiaries of yesterday’s research. 
Future research is predicated on lessons learned and the ability to leverage both success 
and failure. 
A. SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS ANSWERED 
This research has presented both background and analysis to help understand, 
defend, and answer the primary research question. Let’s revisit the secondary questions. 
1. What R&D Organizations Were in Place to Successfully Develop the 
GPS System that We Know Today? 
After 1960, the Air Force and Navy realized the need for developing a global 
navigation and positioning system. The two agencies had different mission requirements 
and chose independent approaches in developing this task. Both agencies used the 
existing DOD R&D laboratories, FFRDC facilities, and staff researchers to perform 
studies and develop concepts/prototypes for developing a radio navigation system. 
The Navy funded Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), ARPA, and Johns Hopkins 
Applied Physics Laboratory for the development of two satellite navigation systems 
named Transit and Timation. Using the existing facilities and existing intellectual 
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property was a great benefit for the Navy and helped speed up the process of developing 
and launching the first Transit satellite constellation in less than seven years.   
In 1963, the U.S. Air Force sponsored Space and Missile Systems Organization 
(SAMSO) and Aerospace Corporation in performing research on a navigation system that 
later became known as System 621B program. Both were experienced organizations that 
performed research in the past for subsystems that could be integrated within the satellite 
navigation system. The exiting Air Force test facility, White Sands Proving Ground 
located in New Mexico, allowed researchers to perform simulations and extensive testing 
for the System 621B program. Having the technical expertise and facilities available for 
assessing different solutions allowed the Air Force to prove and develop techniques such 
as three-dimensional navigation, pseudorandom noise, etc., that were integrated into the 
GPS system.     
 In 1973, the Air Force was designated by DOD as the lead Agency responsible 
for coordinating all GPS activities. It was established that a Joint Program Office (JPO) 
will develop the GPS system with the support of all DOD Agencies. Space and Missile 
Systems Organization was chosen to host the JPO’s development of the GPS system. The 
Air Force coordinated the availability of DOD R&D and FFRDC facilities and 
participation of scientists supporting GPS development. DOD personnel along with 
defense contractors worked toward finalizing the joint baseline requirements for the GPS 
system and combined the research performed for the TRANSIT, Timation, and System 
621B projects for final design and development of the GPS constellation. The successful 
execution of the GPS program, from the inception until full operational capability, was 
the result of strong collaboration between all Agencies and the support and experience of 
organizations such as NRL, ARPA, SAMSO, and APL.  
The successful development of the GPS system shows the importance of 
maintaining defense R&D laboratories and FFRDC organizations involved in DOD 
programs. The experience and expertise acquired by these organizations is irreplaceable 
for future defense activities. 
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2. What Budgets and Schedules Influenced the GPS Development? 
After the development and launch of the GPS Block I satellites, the GPS program 
encountered a budget cut of almost 30%. Such budget cuts impacted phase II of the 
program that included the development of the GPS Block II satellites. Understanding that 
a space-based worldwide navigation system is a critical capability for the military, JPO 
along with the support organizations and DOD Agencies were able to re-scope the 
program and redesign the entire system allowing the program to continue.  
The program also encountered a holdup in 1986, when the JPO did not have a 
launch vehicle for GPS satellites due to the Challenger accident. JPO found an alternative 
avenue by redesigning the Block II satellites to be compatible with Delta II launch 
vehicles and resumed the launch of phase II satellites.  
JPO, as a program and system integrator, had a clear and consistent vision in 
developing the GPS system. JPO was able to overcome the technical challenges, 
addressing and mitigating risks, by working closely with all Agencies and support 
contractors to identify optimal solutions through research, studies, lab and field testing, 
thus reaching the GPS system’s full operational capability in 1995.     
3. What are the Implications of GPS Successes Resultant from R&D 
Investments? 
The benefits that humanity has received due to the creation and development of 
GPS are both quantifiable and unquantifiable. In 2013, an estimate, just based on 
measured U.S. productivity resultant from the use of GPS, is $55.8B. Software 
applications like Google Maps or Pokemon GO are difficult to quantify due to a lack of 
standardized metric associated with personal gains in efficiency or pleasure. The benefits 
extend far beyond the intended militaristic applications back in the 1960s and 1970s, in 
that GPS is used for flight autonomy for UAVs and ground vehicles, precision guided 
munitions, and battlefield tracking of assets/resources. Overall, the military, civilians, and 
the U.S. economy have all benefitted greatly resultant from the development of GPS. 
The GPS system is considered a successful R&D program that transitioned to a 
production system with worldwide benefits through maturation and increased capability 
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over time. This research needs to caveat the success of GPS with the frequent failure of 
other research initiatives. Most research endeavors don’t experience the success and 
visibility of the GPS system. But there are two important principles that need to be 
understood regarding failure. One: failure should not be a deterrent from conducting the 
research. Failure is often used as a building block to success. Two: Lessons learned 
should always be extended to new initiatives. Any discoveries made during the research 
that did not  necessarily lead to the desired conclusion/output can be leveraged to other 
efforts.  
B. RELATION BACK TO THE THESIS STATEMENT 
GPS is a fantastic example of why R&D needs to remain a priority for the U.S., 
and other private corporations and international governments should at a minimum 
acknowledge the potential large successes that could introduce paradigm shifts, providing 
an iteration of technological superiority over competitors or adversaries. Once 
acknowledged, the respective organizations can assess their competitive landscapes to 
determine the amount of resources that should be devoted to R&D. The development of 
GPS reinforces the notion that if think tanks are in existence, and are properly postured 
with personnel and resources to solve problems and/or produce good ideas, innovation 
will continue to occur. With innovation, our soldiers and civilians alike can reap the 
benefits of increased capability and gained efficiencies through technological progress 
and evolution. GPS illustrates why investments in R&D are worthwhile, and rationalizes 
why the U.S. should continue to invest in R&D. Today’s instantiation of GPS has both 
tangible and intangible metrics associated with a massive Return On Investment (ROI). 
The intangible ROI partly consists of the discoveries and improvements in technology 
related to and compounded by its discovery. Many good ideas happen by accident. Many 
outputs and discoveries from R&D are side effects from the originally purposed R&D. 
GPS is precisely that. 
C. RECOMMENDATION 
Currently, and historically, DOD R&D receives budgetary increases in times of 
impending conflict engagement. A recommendation to ensure DOD R&D execution is 
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properly timed and fed into the acquisition process is to place increased emphasis on 
R&D during peace time or toward the end of conflicts. Military intelligence serves as a 
feeder to relay battlefield operational needs, details of future adversaries, and 
environments of future conflict to the entities conducting R&D. This R&D directly 
supports the development of the weapons systems required to defeat enemies and engage 
adversaries in their respective environments. Procurement should be at its peak during 
wartime. If the U.S. is executing extensive R&D of required capabilities while actively 
engaged with an enemy, it is already behind and at significant risk for longer conflict, 
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